


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1 — UPPER IRRAWADDY RIVER FLOODS

Kachin State


In the past week, heavy rainfall across Kachin State and northern Myanmar has reportedly swollen the banks of the Irrawaddy River and flooded mountainous streams near the China-Myanmar border. On 31 May, in Chipwi Township, the N Mai River began to overflow into nearby IDP sites, with residents relocating to higher ground, including to monasteries and the homes of relatives and friends. IDP sites in Chipwi town had a combined population of 1,591 people as of April 2024. In Myitkyina town, the river water level reportedly rose to at least 1,205 centimeters on 2 June and flooded wards and IDP sites along its banks, pushing locals to relocate. An entire Kachin Baptist Church IDP site in Myitkyina Township was reportedly submerged, and over 1,000 people in the township were reported to be in **need** of food and drinking water. Across the river in Waingmaw Township, residents and IDPs in Naung Chain and Labang villages had reportedly relocated for the same reason by 2 June. In Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO)-controlled Sadung town, heavy rainfall in nearby hills reportedly flooded civilian housing, killing five people, and reportedly destroyed clinics, a monastery, school housing, and farmlands. Though Kachin State saw significant flooding in June 2024 (with the water level reaching over 1,400 centimeters in Myitkyina), impacting over 10,000 people in Myitkyina, Waingmaw, Chipwi, Tanai, and Hpakant towns, an IDP in Chipwi Township reportedly told local media that this year was worse than the last. An IDP in Labang village, Waingmaw Township, explained that people who were already struggling to meet basic needs - saying "it was already difficult to find enough to eat" — now face greater hardship.

SAC restrictions likely to hinder response

Even though the primary flood impact zone is in areas without active fighting, State Administration Council (SAC) restrictions are likely to stifle the movement of goods. While fighting between the SAC and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) has decreased in Waingmaw Township and along much of the state's border with China since 2024, many people in these areas (many now under KIO/A control) are still recovering from that fighting — and from flooding in 2024. Meanwhile, SAC restrictions on the movement of aid to, and people from, KIO-administered flood zones are highly likely to continue; the SAC's sweeping internet and phone shutdown across the state will likely continue to obstruct effective response coordination, and flood damage to roads is also likely to complicate both aid delivery and civilians' ability to relocate. Due to erosion from the N Mai River (which flows from Chipwi to Myitkyina town), the Myitkyina-Chipwi highway has been significantly damaged and is mostly impassable, while the Sumprabum-Putao road is also reportedly damaged from rainfall. Considering that needs will remain high in flood impacted zones of Kachin State, humanitarian responders will likely have to navigate SAC restrictions and damaged infrastructure to the greatest extent possible in order to meet needs likely to emerge around access to clean drinking water, the spread of diarrhoeal diseases, and a lack of electricity for cooking.


Vulnerable at risk

While the recent floods have indiscriminately impacted people across large areas of the state, specific populations may be particularly vulnerable. These include populations such as the elderly, those in poor health, long-term IDPs, and residents of remote villages, who may be more susceptible to malnutrition and have greater challenges accessing assistance. In areas of Chipwi Township where rare earth mining is present, communities are reportedly also concerned about potential of further landslides due to degraded terrain as part of rare earth mining "bleaching" process. While some state residents may be able to use phone lines, such as near the border with China or while using Starlink services, remote areas affected by flooding may face severe challenges in finding external support. For example, while the proximity of Khaunglanphu Township's Lanse town to mountainous streams suggests communities there could have been badly affected, there are few online reports so far of flood impacts there, possibly due to its remoteness and lack of connectivity. Some state residents also reportedly relied on international radio services, many of which have closed or slowed reporting due to global funding withdrawals. Even after water levels rise, the local response will likely have to navigate multiple competing needs, including among those without access to electricity and internet.




Trend Watch

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK



CIVILIAN OBJECTS DAMAGED OR DESTROYED BY ARSON OR ARMED VIOLENCE

(1 JAN 2021 - 3 JUN 2025)



National Myan ammar Namar National Myan ammar Myanin Marinnal

National Myanmar

PRIMARY CONCERNS







2 — ASEAN CALLS FOR CEASEFIRE EXTENSION AND INCLUSIVE DIALOGUE

Nationwide

On 27 May, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) released a statement calling for an extended and expanded ceasefire in Myanmar "to create a safe and conducive environment in ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid and assistance, to reach those in need and establishing an inclusive national dialogue". At the opening statement of the ASEAN Summit, hosted in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim also emphasized that "throughout this process quiet engagement has mattered". Then, on 1 June, he reportedly told media outlets that several Myanmar actors had been invited for dialogue; a resistance leader told this analytical unit that the Malaysian Foreign Ministry organised closed-door sessions that included delegates from the National Unity Government (NUG) and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs). The NUG reportedly welcomed the ASEAN statement calling for ceasefires and dialogue but warned that ceasefire negotiations alone would not lead to a resolution of hostilities in Myanmar. Thailand's foreign minister reportedly said that ASEAN must continue its constructive engagement on Myanmar, noting that efforts spearheaded by Thailand and Malaysia have led to breakthroughs despite the slow pace of mediation. Meanwhile, civil society activists noted that ASEAN was giving time and cover to the State Administration Council (SAC) and **not helping** to solve the crisis in Myanmar while the SAC "blocks, misuses and diverts aid".

If not dialogue on peace, then dialogue on aid


ASEAN's recent diplomatic manoeuvres may present one of the first opportunities for the SAC and resistance actors to engage in dialogue and could lead to incremental improvements in humanitarian delivery and coordination. One of the most significant developments from the Kuala Lumpur summit was that neither the SAC or resistance actors outright rejected the ASEAN proposals for extending the ceasefire or for inclusive dialogue (though the NUG did go further and propose that ASEAN establish a ceasefire monitoring mechanism). This may indicate both parties' acceptance of the basic premise that aid delivery should improve. The NUG and EROs may agree to these calls, primarily to gain further legitimacy on the world stage and demonstrate that they are responsible actors, particularly in the wake of a series of earthquakes that have killed thousands and damaged much of central Myanmar. Local aid workers will likely remain in a precarious position during aid missions as the SAC has given no indication that it will stop targeting civilian infrastructure or marketplaces in resistance-controlled territory, or that it will allow greater access for actors not aligned with it in territory it controls. Granted, discussions around a more durable peace may be farther off; one of the defining issues of post-coup Myanmar — the involvement of the military in politics - remains unaddressed and may continue to stand in the way of a long-term cessation of hostilities. Nonetheless, a de-escalation in armed hostilities could relax the space for delivery of humanitarian aid and allow more opportunities to provide assistance in areas previously more difficult to reach.

Western Myar nar Myanmar Wester

KEY TRENDS

The AA intensified its rules around recruitment, while heavy rainfall led to early flooding across the state. Myanmar-Bangladesh trade gates re-open, but shelter material is in short supply for IDPs to prepare for the incoming monsoon season.

Western Myanmar



^{*} Any event included in this timeline without an embedded source link has either been reported to this analytical unit directly by a reliable source, or drawn from private/limited-circulation material.

Summary

The Arakan Army (AA) announced that it would restrict the movement of civilians eligible for recruitment from its controlled territories. This prompted rare protests, from ethnic Rakhine communities, and fears that the policy could impact employment and educational opportunities for households already facing an State Administration Council (SAC)-imposed communications and goods blockade that has crippled the state's economy. Cross-border trade reportedly increased along part of the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, raising hopes that prices in northern Rakhine State might stabilise. Heavy rainfall led to flooding across the state, and both IDPs and other state residents expressed the need for shelter materials as they prepare for the rest of the monsoon season.

PRIMARY CONCERNS







3 — AA RESTRICTS MOVEMENT OF ELIGIBLE CONSCRIPTS

Rakhine State

On 22 May, the Arakan Army (AA) reportedly announced that it would restrict the ability of civilians — those eligible $for \ military \ service-to \ leave \ territory \ under \ its \ control.$ Two months earlier, on 18 March, it had enacted its National Defense Emergency Provision (NDEP), claiming that all males aged between 18-45, and females aged 18-35 were eligible for conscription into the AA. It said that the NDEP was passed to "prioritise the safety, security, and stability of the lives, homes, and property of all people within the Arakan region"; that restrictions would remain in place "until the stable military situation is achieved"; but that residents could seek exemptions for health conditions not treatable by the Arakan People's Health Department.

The AA justified its more recent restriction on movement by saying it would protect Rakhine civilians from being detained — on the basis of their state-based national identification numbers — by the State Administration Council (SAC) outside of Rakhine State, and from risks posed by explosive ordnance at entry and exit points of AA-controlled territory. Local media reported, last week, that local AA authorities had detained around 40 civilians protesting its conscription notices in Taungup Township. Youths in the state have reportedly expressed concerns that the restrictions could rob them of education and employment opportunities and worsen economic conditions for households who might rely on remittances from relatives outside the state. On 28 May, the Chin Political Steering Committee in Rakhine State released a statement urging the AA to reconsider its restrictions in this case applying to ethnic Chin people in AA-controlled areas — in alignment with the public well-being.

Western Myanmar

PRIMARY CONCERNS

Few places to go

The AA's attempts to restrict civilians from leaving Rakhine State could increase protection related concerns for youths trying to escape conscription, and could negatively impact the livelihoods of households. With respect to the latter, if households' potential breadwinners cannot seek employment or continue their education, this could deprive these households of muchneeded income; many households have already been affected by poor economic conditions and the recruitment of family members. The AA appears to enjoy considerable support (and little protest) from ethnic Rakhine people, suggesting that the 18 May protest against conscription in Taungup marked a highly unpopular policy. According to a local outlet, the protestors did not think of using media to raise awareness but were instead trying to gain traction with AA commanders. The SAC-imposed communications shutdown, and the AA's reported monopoly on use of Starlink internet services, has meant there is a lack of access to information for civilians across Rakhine state, who are unable to easily communicate across townships or outside the region. This complicates the ability of outside observers to ascertain public support for AA's policies or the actions it takes against civilians seeking free movement. Moving forward, the humanitarian response may also have to contend with what an AA conscription drive could mean for further fighting in Kyaukpyu Township and whether, as some analysts suggest, it foreshadows plans to capture the rest of Rakhine State. In such a scenario, the humanitarian response would have to contend with rising protection related concern for Rakhine civilians in regards to AA conscription as well as a possible sharp uptick in fighting with SAC forces in urban areas.







4 — CROSS-BORDER TRADE INCREASES

Teknaf, Bangladesh; Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State

On 29 May, cross-border trade at the Myanmar-Bangladesh border began to rise, according to local media. Traders said that some trade had resumed at a key post: Maungdaw's

Kanyin Chaung Economic Zone, which is connected (across the Naf River) to Teknaf in Bangladesh, Locals told this analytical unit that authorities on both sides of the border had agreed this week, if tacitly, to allow trade to a greater degree. Trade had largely shut down at the end of 2024, amid fighting between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Arakan Army (AA) in Maungdaw Township, and appeared to be further hurt by the AA's seizures of several Bangladeshi fishing vessels in the start of 2025. When the AA gained control of the border in December 2024, it released a statement banning vessels in Naf River, and cargo ships reportedly stopping at the Teknaf port. At least some degree of informal trade continued to move across the border, though not officially sanctioned. Other problems have also arisen related to the unsanctioned — and unregulated — trade: on 14 May, a local media outlet reported on the rise of counterfeit medicine imported to Rakhine State from Bangladesh and India, leading to the AA officials implementing screening measures. Additionally, local media reported on 2 June that due to rising transportation costs and trade limitations, the price of cooking oil in Maungdaw Township was increasing.


Hope that prices will drop

The easing of restrictions to cross-border trade along the Naf River could increase the volume of goods moving into (and out of) Rakhine State, and may thereby help to alleviate possible price rises or shortages of fertiliser, medicine, and food items. Moreover, a Rohingya resident from Maungdaw Township told this analytical unit that increased trade resumption could bring additional revenue for the AA in the form of fees from more traders and boat owners who export food items to Bangladesh. A local source told this analytical unit that the AA favours ethnic Rakhine people in border trade and that only Rohingya businessmen who are close to AA could receive their permission to trade goods. This suggests that any resumption of trade is most likely to benefit ethnic Rakhine and Bangladeshi traders. For humanitarian responders, continued improvements in trade across the Naf River could help in the provision of food aid and materials to displaced persons and vulnerable groups in northern Rakhine State. For civilians in northern Rakhine State, trade improvements could lead to lower prices, easing the daily cost-of-living burden and expanding household opportunities for income.

Northeast Mya mar Myanmar Mortheas

KEY TRENDS

Early flooding escalated humanitarian needs in Kachin State, while trade appeared to open up between the state and China. Fighting between the SAC and KIA picked up in Hpakant town, while tensions between the SSPP and MNDAA rose in Lashio Township, and the SAC seemed to make gains against resistance actors in Southern Shan State.



Summary

Northeast Myanmar

Significant flooding occurred in Kachin State, primarily in areas near the Irrawaddy River and close to mountain streams in the east of the state. Despite the primary flood impact zone being in areas without active fighting, State Administration Council (SAC)-imposed restrictions on the movement of aid and people are highly likely to remain in place. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) re-opened trade gates along the China-Myanmar border. National Democratic Alliance Army and SAC leaders concluded a meeting in Eastern Shan State, while tensions between the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) rose in Lashio Township. Intense fighting reportedly continued between SAC and KIA troops near Hpakant town, and between SAC and Ta'ang National Liberation Army troops in Nawnghkio Township. In Southern Shan State, SAC forces reportedly re-captured outposts from KNDF-led forces in Pinlaung Township.

Northeast Myanmar

PRIMARY CONCERNS







5 - FIGHTING HEIGHTENS NEEDS

Pinlaung Township, Southern Shan State

On 27 May, State Administration Council (SAC) and Pa-O National Army (PNA) forces reportedly regained control of Saung Pyaung village, in Pinlaung Township, following weeks of fighting with Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) and local People's Defence Forces (PDFs) in Saung Pyaung and surrounding villages. Since 17 May, heavy fighting in and around Saung Pyaung village had reportedly displaced about 5,000 people, who primarily fled to Pin Khon and Wa Lee villages, and to Pinlaung town. Despite fighting decreasing, displaced civilians have reportedly not returned home due to fears of SAC violence and retaliation, including use of airstrikes and artillery on civilian infrastructure. At the same time, humanitarian access reportedly remains limited, with tensions between armed actors on the ground, and SAC and PNA restrictions in territory they regained. Displaced people are reportedly having to provide for themselves through communal donations, but lack some food items, clean water, shelter, and medical care. Saung Pyaung village was the site of intense fighting before, in March 2024, when resistance actors briefly captured some positions, with SAC and PNO retaliatory attacks on civilian infrastructure back then also preventing displaced people from returning home for several months. This time around, SAC and PNA forces are also accused of torching houses where they suspected people of association with or sympathy for resistance forces. Local residents report that PNA and SAC forces have looted public and private property when based in nearby villages, including farming tools and vehicles, and subsequently sold them in nearby towns.

Communities struggle to meet needs

Needs are high in Pinlaung Township, where the response landscape is mostly dominated by local charity groups and volunteers. The situation is likely worse since the earthquake and needs around shelter are set to increase as this region enters the monsoon season. The overlapping crises of earthquake recovery, conflictinduced displacement, and seasonal monsoon are likely to overburden a fragile local response landscape. The March earthquakes reportedly damaged around 219 homes in 12 villages in Pinlaung Township, killed two people, and injured two others. This time of the year is also crucial for planting and tending to crops in Southern Shan State, but some households will stay away from their homes and fields despite the likelihood of this absence damaging yields and future earnings. The longer the displacement continues, the more severe the impact on food security and livelihood opportunities could be, as individuals are also more likely to be pushed towards exploitative labor. According to local reports, resistance actors may have attempted their most recent operation because of Pinlaung town's proximity to the capital Nay Pyi Taw, and it may have been an attempt to test the SAC's resilience to attacks along the Pinlaung-Loikaw and Pinlaung-Nay Pyi Taw roads. It is thus possible that fighting continues in Pinlaung Township, creating additional hurdles to aid delivery and civilian protection.


Northwest Mynmar Morthwest Morthwest

KEY TRENDS

Chin refugees in Mizoram continued to navigate flood damage, while people affected by the earthquakes in Mandalay continued to face challenges; the SAC raided an earthquake fundraiser and local authorities told earthquake victims to vacate public buildings. PDFs launched further attacks in Myingyan, while SAC raids in Magway Region displaced thousands more people.

Northwest Myanmar

TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS



^{*} Any event included in this timeline without an embedded source link has either been reported to this analytical unit directly by a reliable source, or drawn from private/limited-circulation material.

Summary

In India's Mizoram state, initial severe flood damage to Chin refugee camps has increased concerns about the difficulty of external aid delivery — particularly to vulnerable and injured residents — around these remote sites. In Mandalay city, State Administration Council (SAC) forces told earthquake victims to vacate public buildings and raided an earthquake fundraiser. In Mandalay, Sagaing, and Magway regions, People's Defence Forces (PDFs) launched attacks on SAC positions, and SAC raids and artillery fire displaced thousands of locals.

PRIMARY CONCERNS







6 - FLOODS DESTROY REFUGEE CAMPS

Mizoram, India

Since 27 May, heavy rainfall on the India-Myanmar border in Mizoram State has led to flooded villages and displacement sites and reportedly caused some landslides. On 31 May, at least 130 temporary displacement shelters in Tuidang and Kakichhuah villages in Lawngtlai District, along a waterway that flows into the Kaladan River, were reportedly swept away by flooding. In addition, on 30 May, a rain-induced landslide in Vaphai village in Champhai District, reportedly killed three refugees from Kalay Township in Sagaing Region. Local leaders told this analytical unit that up to 669 Chin refugees had been affected. The Chin refugees in Lawngtlai District are mostly from Paletwa Township, Chin State, and began to flee to Mizoram State in 2021 due to State Administration Council (SAC) attacks on civilians and armed actors' camps. However, now that the Arakan Army (AA) controls most of the township, most Chin refugees are reportedly unwilling to return due to protection concerns related to the ethnic Rakhine group. Refugees whose shelters were destroyed or damaged in the flooding reportedly took shelter in public schools and community halls in nearby villages. On 2 June, local media reported that local response actors were still not able to reach people in Lawngtlai District, and that the refugees needed food items, medicine, and shelter.

Chin refugees cut off

Many Chin refugees in camps in Mizoram State live in remote locations and, amid the rainfall reportedly continuing this week, there are serious concerns about how quickly support can reach them. Several local responders told this analytical unit that humanitarian access was limited before, and that due to heavy rainfall across India's northeast, there are highly likely to be further delays in remote locations. Sources told this analytical unit that since 2024, aid activities have decreased in Lawngtlai District, which could be due to decreased levels of public support, as well as pressure from the federal government in Delhi. Lawngtlai District camps also recently experienced a diarrhea outbreak in January 2025 due to lack of clean water, as well as malaria and typhoid cases, according to locals who spoke to this analytical unit. Back then, the sick would have attempted to travel to Lawngtlai town for medical treatment; now this may be difficult if not impossible. Moreover, sources from Lawngtlai District told this analytical unit that, due to the continuous rainfall, it is also possible that displaced communities in Paletwa Township could be facing similar issues.

Northwest Myanmar

PRIMARY CONCERNS







7 — SAC ADVANCE DISPLACES THOUSANDS

Pauk and Pakokku townships, Magway Region

On 29 May, six State Administration Council (SAC) trucks and around 200 soldiers reportedly entered Pauk Township, displacing residents of 13 villages along the Pakokku-Pauk road. Prior to this, the same SAC column had reportedly raided a Kamma Defence Force camp on 28 May, detained four people from four villages near Kamma town (in Pakokku Township), and conducted raids there that temporarily displaced around 8,000 people — until the SAC troops left for Pauk Township. A local resident told this analytical unit that the SAC troops camped at a village monastery and assaulted civilians, including those they had detained. National Unity Government (NUG) Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management authorities reported that the SAC contingent later stationed itself in Yae Pyar village, in Pauk Township.

Rain brings more gloom for displaced


Pakokku District has experienced significant displacement since the coup, but this is a season with heightened challenges for IDPs. Fighting between the SAC and People's Defence Forces (PDFs) has increased in the area since 2023, leading to both temporary and prolonged displacement. However, regardless of whether or not displacement is temporary, people displaced during this time of year will have to deal with significant challenges arising from the monsoon season, including ongoing heavy rains and wind anticipated for the next few days. It is possible that the SAC is launching these operations at the outbreak of the monsoon season in order to secure access to several Pyu Saw Htee villages in neighbouring Gangaw District which have reportedly been blocked off by local PDFs. If this is the case, it is possible that fighting will intensify — and displacement rise — if PDFs attempt to hold on to their positions and maintain the blockades of goods into Pyu Saw Htee areas. A Pakokku District resident told this analytical unit that more than 100 vehicles had been brought to the SAC's Pakokku 101 Division base to support these SAC operations. If fighting increases, humanitarian responders, including local parahita groups and NUG authorities, will likely need to mobilise food, shelter, and medical support, in addition to supporting the relocation of residents, all during monsoon rains.

Southeast Mya mar Myanmar Southeas

KEY TRENDS

The KNLA captured more SAC bases along the Thai-Myanmar border, and SAC retaliatory airstrikes continued to strike the region (including, possibly, on Thai soil). SAC shelling hit civilians in Tanintharyi Region, and Karenni State resistance actors reportedly made battlefield gains.

Southeast Myanmar



Southeast Myanmar

Summary

In Karenni State, displaced persons faced critical shortages in food and adequate shelter as the monsoon season approached. A large majority of the state has been displaced for prolonged periods of time, and despite the absence of fighting in many areas, the continued threat of State Administration Council (SAC) airstrikes on civilian areas prevents their return home. Meanwhile, in Mon State, resistance actors merged and announced the formation of a new armed group. In Karen State, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 6 launched several successful attacks on SAC camps along the Thai-Myanmar border in Myawaddy Township. SAC airstrikes predictably caused civilian casualties and displacement, with some people fleeing across the river into Thailand.

PRIMARY CONCERNS







8 - KARENNI IDPS REQUEST FOOD AND SHELTER

Karenni State and Pekon Township, Southern Shan State

In Karenni State, IDPs are reportedly running low on food, and sheltering in temporary housing inadequate for the incoming monsoon season. On 24 May, humanitarian responders told media that IDPs in eastern Loikaw and western Hpruso townships were running low on food due to fighting disrupting harvests and damage to croplands caused by flooding in late 2024. On 28 May, local media reported that some IDPs at the Naung Hkite camp in Pekon Township were borrowing rice to cover their food needs because they could not harvest their summer crops due to fighting around Moebye village tract. Moreover, in Demoso Township IDP camps, schools built with tarpaulin reportedly need to be re-constructed, and in Leh Taw (3) IDP camp, the committee leader reported that many IDPs had been suffering from rice shortages for more than a month. According to the Karenni State Interim Executive

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms "Karen State" and "Karenni State" preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at https://www.khrg.org/maps.

Southeast Myanmar

PRIMARY CONCERNS

Council, there are around 350,000 displaced people in Karenni State and Pekon Township. Despite a lack of fighting in Loikaw town since the State Administration Council (SAC) returned in 2024, IDPs are largely unwilling to return, while the SAC's continued airstrikes and presence in Demoso, Hpruso, Bawlake, Hpasawng, and Loikaw prevents large-scale returns elsewhere in Karenni State.

Poor harvests and monsoon rains

Food shortages among Karenni IDPs highlight the impact of continuous displacement, fighting, and airstrikes on food security, and come at a time when relief may be harder to find. While inadequate shelter for the monsoon season has been a recurrent issue since the coup, global aid funding withdrawals threaten even the low levels of support that many IDPs have received. Food insecurity for Karenni IDPs is likely to be significant this monsoon season due to the impacts of September 2024 flooding and fighting along the Shan-Karenni border on agriculture (including the harvesting of summer crops). Local told this analytical unit that SAC forces in Moebye village tract, in Pekon Township, have previously fired artillery to prevent civilians from planting and harvesting crops; temporary lulls in fighting are unlikely to drastically improve food security prospects in the long-term if armed hostilities and SAC violence continue even periodically. Tarpaulin reportedly remains the preferred material to construct IDP tents due to being lightweight and easy to transport, needed when IDP sites have to move due to threat of SAC air attacks, shelling, ground assaults, or natural disasters.







9 — TENSIONS INCREASE NEAR THE BORDER

Myawaddy Township, Karen State

This past week, Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)
Brigade 6 and aligned People's Defence Forces (PDFs)
conducted a string of <u>attacks</u> in Myawaddy Township.
KNLA-led troops captured the State Administration
Council's (SAC) <u>Blel Doh</u> base on 23 May, the <u>Ka Ne Lay</u> base on 28 May, the <u>Maw Kee, Toe Kyo</u>, and <u>Bayint Naung</u> bases

on 30 May, and then the Thay Baw Boe base on 3 June. During the assault on the Thay Baw Boe base, around 100 SAC reinforcements reportedly arrived but some were detained or killed, while others retreated to a base in nearby Waw Lay. As the KNLA-led attacks intensified, the SAC launched airstrikes and fired artillery, causing civilian casualties. On 28 May, SAC airstrikes on Sone See Myaing village — home to the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) Headquarters – reportedly killed a woman and injured a child. The bombing also reportedly pushed at least **500** people across the Moei River into Thailand, while others near the river (but still in Myanmar) were reported to lack access to clean water or adequate shelter. The fighting has also closed the Myawaddy-Waw Lay Road for civilians and trade. A local responder reported that vulnerable groups cannot reenter their villages and are consuming unclean water, leading to diarrhoea outbreaks. A health worker from the Karen Department of Health and Welfare — the Karen National Union (KNU) health wing — reported that there had been minimal assistance for a year in Thay Baw Boe village tract, and that malaria and diarrhea cases are expected to increase further during the monsoon season.

If fighting continues, displacement likely

It is highly likely that SAC airstrikes and artillery will continue to be used in response to KNLA operations in Myawaddy Township, either to recapture lost positions or to defend remaining camps such as the Way Law strategic base. In turn, this is likely to cause civilian casualties and displacement. In such a scenario, persons displaced for a prolonged period will become particularly prone to disease outbreaks during the monsoon season, when more robust shelter is needed, and standing water can lead to mosquito-borne illnesses, for example. Moreover, people who fled across the Thai border have reportedly been unable to do agricultural work in host communities to earn income, and even people not displaced may face challenges due to transport restrictions hurting the movement of goods from Myawaddy town, which is the local market hub. The SAC is unlikely to accept the loss of these camps to the KNLA, and will likely seek to mobilise more troops and recapture those lost, such as it did at the Blel Doh and Thay Baw Boe bases in 2022. If this occurs, further displacement and cases of SAC violence against civilians in Myawaddy Township are highly likely.

Fortnightly Update Contributing information sources to this document include public and non-public humanitarian for Humanitarian Responders Contact: analyst.myanmar2020@gmail.com