

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

# Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

NORTHERN SHAN STATE

TNLA / SAC  
Fighting Nears Town

W23-25 | 2025

JUNE

05  
18

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
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in**focus**

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# infocus

## TNLA / SAC Fighting Nears Town

NAWNGHKIO TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

Ta'ang National Liberation Army and State Administration Council (SAC) forces [continued](#) intense armed hostilities this week, with fighting reportedly nearing Nawnghkio town as SAC forces advanced north via Highway 41 from Tawng Hkam village. Fighting intensified in April, as the SAC pushed north, with front lines reportedly shifting to the [Kan Gyi](#) village tract by 14 June. SAC airstrikes and [drones](#) reportedly continued to strike civilian areas, with over 1,000 civilians fleeing to nearby Kyaukme Township and taking temporary shelter in monasteries, schools, and host communities, according to a 12 June [report](#). Aid workers have alerted media outlets to the [challenges](#) involved in providing food and other aid in Nawnghkio Township, primarily due to poor road conditions and donor funding setbacks. A Kyaukme local told this analytical unit that some Nawnghkio Township residents have fled to Pyin Oo Lwin Township in the west, while others moved east to Kyaukme Township. Some IDPs in Kyaukme Township are reportedly still close enough to access their farmlands in Nawnghkio Township; when fighting ebbs, displaced farmers are able to move to their farmland early in the morning and return in the afternoon, according to a local who spoke to this analytical unit. In Nawnghkio [town](#), residents have begun to flee, but others remain in the town with relatives, facing phone and internet outages among other challenges.

### Risk of town depopulation

As fighting nears Nawnghkio town, the SAC advance threatens prolonged displacement for town residents and disruption of town markets. Although most of the town's residents fled during Operation 1027, some began to return in late 2024. Now, with fighting around just 9 km away, and the possibility of SAC airstrikes nearby, residents are again fleeing. Some social media [posts](#) suggest that only a small segment of the pre-coup population remains. Nawnghkio Township has been a frontline in fighting between TNLA and SAC forces since Operation 1027, with developments in recent weeks suggesting that SAC ground forces are slowly but steadily pushing forward, which could increase displacement and humanitarian needs. In addition, residents of urban areas in neighbouring Kyaukme Township could also feel threatened by SAC ground assaults and begin to flee. Humanitarian responders will likely have to navigate the disruption that fighting nearer to Nawnghkio town and other urban areas will have on local markets, particularly for residents and traders who were just recovering from the intensity of hostilities and damage to infrastructure during Operation 1027.

### Impact on farmers

The continuation of fighting in Nawnghkio Township could threaten the planting of the monsoon season crops there, which could further impact local livelihoods. Despite being displaced, many farmers reportedly still have safe access to their farmlands during this critical planting season. Some farmers have already planted their crops in Nawnghkio Township, according to sources who spoke to this analytical unit, while for others the process is ongoing. However, if fighting increases or spreads to current host communities, it could become too dangerous for farmers to go even temporarily to their farms, resulting in poorer monsoon harvests. Reduced crop yields could, in turn, threaten economic recovery of local communities and also impact the resilience of IDPs and the host communities on which they rely for food support. Ongoing fighting in Nawnghkio Township underscores the need for protection of civilians and farmers, with humanitarian responders likely to continue to see rising and varied humanitarian needs.

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Reduced crop yields could, in turn, threaten economic recovery of local communities and also impact the resilience of IDPs and the host communities on which they rely for food support.



# trendlines

## HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND  
**0.08%**


## TWO-WEEK NUMBER

**19** NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 17 JUNE 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE  
**88,740**

### TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



### ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



### trendwatch

The SAC continued to conduct airstrikes across much of the country.

On 5 June, an SAC airstrike killed five people and injured six others in Nyaung Kan village in Saw Township, Magway Region.

On 6 June, SAC airstrikes killed nine people, including four children, in Lone Khin village tract in Hpakant Township, Kachin State.

On 9 June, SAC airstrikes killed four people and severely injured eight others in Kyauk Gyi and Pazun Phray villages Thandwe Township, Rakhine State.

On 15 June, SAC motorised gliders bombed Than Nu Taw village in Myaing Township in Magway Region, killing six people and injuring several others.

Tensions persisted between ethnic armed organisations in Shan State.

On 15 June, SSPP and TNLA troops fought near Hoosuong village in Kyaukme Township, Northern Shan State, and multiple TNLA soldiers were allegedly killed.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND  
0.68%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER  
87 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES  
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 17 JUNE 2025


TOTAL  
12,833

Civilian Civilian (Other) Civilian (Alleged Informer)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON  
..... [Q1 2021 – Q2 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

Humanitarian needs continued to rise across multiple states and regions.

On 4 June, local media reported that around 300 people from Kyauktaw and Ponnagyun townships in Rakhine State were infected with malaria, killing at least three people.

On 9 June, local media reported that a clinic in Dawei town, Tanintharyi Region, is at risk of closure due to the detention of two staff and subsequent flight of remaining senior staff.

Rohingya people in Rakhine State faced additional challenges.

On 15 June, local media reported that the Arakan Army is fining Rohingyas for traveling without permits in Maungdaw Township, Rakhine State.

Monsoon rains brought additional challenges elsewhere.

On 13 June, it was reported that over 1,000 acres of paddy fields in Nyaungshwe Township, Southern Shan State, had flooded over the prior three days.

## CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND

0.78%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

10

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 17 JUNE 2025

Health Facility:  
253Education Facility:  
436Religious Facility:  
599


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,288

■ Aerial   ■ Shelling   ■ EDA


### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks,  
and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and  
Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



### trendwatch (cont.)

SAC ground troops, and allied actors, conducted raids.

On 11 June, SAC forces raided and torched Ma Gyi Pin Inn village in Taungoo Township, Bago Region.

On 12 June, SAC forces raided Kin village in Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region, killing four people.

On 13 June, SAC forces conducted raids in Yinmarbin Township, Sagaing Region, during which they detained 40 people.

On 16 June, SAC-aligned Pa-O National Army troops raided and torched Dapuhto village in Hsihseng Township, Southern Shan State.

PDFs staged attacks on SAC and Pyu Saw Htee positions.

On 9 June, PDFs captured a Pyu Saw Htee camp in Se Pin Kyun village in Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region.

On 10 June, PDFs attacked a Pyu Saw Htee camp in Ma Gyi Kan village in Pakokku Township, Magway Region, killing several Pyu Saw Htee militiamen.

# primaryconcerns

## 1 Farmers Fear Unaffordable Prices

### RAKHINE STATE

On 10 June, it was reported that [soaring](#) prices for machinery and spare parts was impacting farmers' ability to plant paddy for the monsoon harvest in Arakan Army (AA)-controlled areas of Rakhine State. The prices of farming machinery, [equipment](#), and spare parts have reportedly soared in large part due to the State Administration Council (SAC)-imposed road and waterway restrictions of goods into Rakhine State since November 2023. Since late 2024, the AA has taken control of most of Rakhine State — isolating the SAC mainly in Sittwe and Kyaukpyu towns — but the SAC's presence outside that state has allowed it to maintain the blockade. Moreover, prices for [fuel](#) and fertilizer — essential for agricultural machinery — have also increased. There are also limited numbers of ploughing [cattle](#) in the state, to assist farmers, as a consequence of several years of fighting. Farmers have reportedly [urged](#) the Arakan People's Revolutionary Government — the AA governing wing — to regulate the prices of agricultural inputs, fertiliser, and fuel. According to the deputy public relations officer of the Rakhine State Farmers' Union, due to rising input prices, only around [500,000 acres](#) of the potentially usable [1.2 acres](#) of farmland in Rakhine State are expected to be cultivated this year — [compared](#) to 700,000 in 2023 and 600,000 in 2024.

### Concerns for future food security

The reduced ability of farmers to plant paddy for the monsoon harvest in AA-controlled areas will likely lead to reduced output of rice — the staple crop — in most of Rakhine State, underscoring the risk of food shortages. When the AA consolidated control of territory in late 2024, local authorities and traders attempted to circumvent the SAC-imposed blockade of goods by using land and waterways from the Indian border through Paletwa in Chin State and to Kyauktaw town in Rakhine — in addition to smaller Arakan Yoma mountain dirt roads. However, access via this route from India is likely to deteriorate during the monsoon season, with [fuel](#) prices already rising in some places due to the impact of heavy rains on trade flows. Some goods have come from Bangladesh as well, although some fertiliser imports from [Bangladesh](#) have reportedly been seized by Bangladesh customs as recently as 14 June. It is possible that recent improvement in Rakhine-Bangladesh trade relations — as reported in the last Fortnightly Update (“Cross-Border Trade Increases”) — could ease prices for farmers in Rakhine State, but it is as yet unclear how much or how consistently. Humanitarian responders will still likely have to navigate reduced monsoon paddy cultivation and the corresponding rise in humanitarian needs, with vulnerable populations including Rohingya people at particular risk of further food shortages.



## 2 BROUK Sounds Alarm About Rohingya Hunger

### MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 12 June, the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK) released a [report](#) drawing attention to extreme levels of food insecurity among Rohingya people in Rakhine State. The [report](#) alleges that the State Administration Council (SAC) has used “starvation and extreme deprivation” as a tactic to persecute Rohingya civilians. In Rakhine State, the SAC-imposed blockade of goods since November 2023 has contributed to a significant rise in food insecurity, as well as shortages in critically-needed medicines. The Arakan Army (AA) removed the SAC from Maungdaw Township in December 2024, but BROUK [accused](#) the AA of “compounding the already dire situation of Rohingya civilians, undermining chances of survival, and forcing many to flee”. BROUK [documented](#) patterns of violations against Rohingya civilians including forced displacement, land confiscation, and extortion by AA troops. A Maungdaw local told this analytical unit that livelihood conditions have become increasingly desperate for many Rohingya people there, who “do not have any income source,” and that the local economy has all but collapsed. Moreover, local AA authorities reportedly began requiring travel [permits](#), which cost 5,000 Myanmar Kyat (1.1 USD) for Rohingya, creating further obstacles for their free movement.

A Maungdaw local told this analytical unit that livelihood conditions have become increasingly desperate for many Rohingya people there, who “do not have any income source,” and that the local economy has all but collapsed.

Local sources told this analytical unit that the AA and local welfare groups had distributed cash and rice to displaced Rohingya three times since removing the SAC from the border region, but that Rohingya people had not received assistance since returning home.

### Food and travel woes

Food security fears for Rohingya people in northern Rakhine State come amid continued reports of AA abuses during its operations to remove Rohingya armed groups from making incursions across the Rakhine-Bangladesh border. AA violations against Rohingya civilians, including travel restrictions, may continue to impact the ability of Rohingya people to engage in economic activity, increasing food insecurity and spurring even more people to make the risky decision to [flee](#) the state. Local sources told this analytical unit that the AA and local welfare groups had distributed cash and rice to displaced Rohingya three times since removing the SAC from the border region, but that Rohingya people had not received assistance since returning home, despite the need. It is important to note that although the travel permit fee is only around 1 USD, ethnic Rakhine likely do not have to pay it, while for the Rohingya without any income or savings, the permit fee may effectively constrain their movement (and ability to seek work). As reported in the most recent [Fortnightly Update](#) (“Cross-Border Trade Increases”), it is possible that improved trade flows from Bangladesh could support economic activity and ease food insecurity in Maungdaw Township. However, humanitarian responders will likely have to navigate prevailing food insecurity among the Rohingya if conditions do not significantly improve.

## 3 Fighting Continues on Asia Highway


### KAWKAREIK TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On the Asia Highway between Kyondoe and Kawkareik towns, [fighting](#) continued this fortnight between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)-led forces, including around the SAC's Infantry Battalion 545 camp, affecting civilians. For example, on 9 June, SAC [airstrikes](#) reportedly struck Paing Yak village, killing four people and injuring 35 others, including children. Then, on 12 June, SAC troops reportedly fired [heavy weapons](#) at Kaw Baw village, killing two children and five other people. Near Kawkareik town, the SAC's Operations Command No. 12 Headquarters has reportedly been a key stronghold in the fighting. While things have reportedly been calmer in Kyondoe town, an aid worker in Hpa-An Township — to the east of Kawkareik Township — claimed to have [witnessed](#) a buildup of SAC reinforcements in Gyaing village and Kyondoe town. A resistance fighter near Kyondoe town told a media outlet that the SAC is also bringing supplies along the [Jai River](#) to prevent the future loss of the town, and that he expects intense fighting to continue.

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### KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms "Karen State" and "Karenni State" preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khr.org/maps>.

## Kawkareik and Kyondoe towns in the crosshairs

Ongoing fighting between Kyondoe and Kawkareik on the Asia Highway has already led to restrictions of travel for civilians and deteriorating livelihood conditions, and further intensification could significantly increase humanitarian needs. The KNLA and PDFs are likely inclined to continue targeted attacks on the SAC in order to further disrupt SAC supply lines to Kawkareik town, and possibly to sever links between Myawaddy — on the Thai border — and Hpa-An town, the state capital. Due to this route's military and economic significance to the SAC, further KNLA-led attacks will likely herald a strong SAC military response, including aerial bombardment and shelling of civilian infrastructure. Ongoing fighting during the monsoon season in southeast Myanmar will almost certainly increase challenges faced by humanitarian responders. Since the coup, Kawkareik town has been bitterly fought over, with SAC forces responding to KNLA attacks on civilian infrastructure, and if fighting continues, local responders could be at risk of violence during service delivery. Civilians meanwhile will likely be in need of shelter materials and seasonal medical care during periods of heavy rainfall if displaced into uninhabited forested areas.

pumps. Fighting has also reportedly disrupted economic activity in the township; sources told this analytical unit that fishing had been a primary source of income in San Hlan and Ti Zit villages, but people are now displaced from these villages and unable to fish. Moreover, local sources said, livestock farmers near Launglon town have reportedly seen a significant drop in customers coming from Dawei town.

Though fighting has steadily increased since May 2025, locals may have less resilience to conflict shocks than in other parts of southeast Myanmar that have experienced decades of military incursions.

### Local markets disrupted

The lack of electricity, inadequate access to clean water, and disrupted economic activity for host communities and IDPs in Launglon Township is likely to lead to further rises in humanitarian needs. The fighting — which already caused electricity cuts and disrupted markets — is likely to continue, and to further harm livelihoods if farmers are unable to work in their paddy fields, house livestock, or engage in other day labour. Launglon Township had not experienced significant displacement before the coup, and even though fighting has steadily increased since May 2025, locals may have less resilience to conflict shocks than in other parts of southeast Myanmar that have experienced decades of military incursions. Notably, many of those displaced in Launglon Township have reportedly been able to stay with host communities, likely keeping their shelter and food needs lower than might otherwise be the case; local responders in the southeast often receive requests related to these needs during the monsoon rains. Nonetheless, humanitarian responders will likely have to navigate local markets and economic activity which could deteriorate further, with vulnerable populations such as elderly and disabled people likely to be most at risk if upticks in fighting lead to more rounds of displacement.

## 4 IDPs Face Multiple Needs


### LAUNGLON TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

Intense fighting in Launglon Township between State Administration Council (SAC) and People's Defence Force (PDF) troops this month has reportedly displaced around 1,000 residents of seven villages, while another 30 villages are also without electricity, according to a 6 June media report. Fighting intensified on 30 May, when PDFs reportedly launched an attack on the SAC's Lakheth Taung camp near Launglon town, and the SAC subsequently fired artillery shells on civilian areas, according to reports. The 1,000 people mostly fled to other nearby villages, including some without electricity, which has also reportedly impacted access to clean water, as some of these villages relied on ground

# Key Security Incidents

## Launglon Township, Tanintharyi Region

(1 Jan - 15 June, 2025)



The shaded relief map is for illustrative and general interpretative purposes only. It does not represent precise elevation or geospatial data. Artistic generalizations are intentionally included to enhance clarity and visual presentation. Elevation data is based on HydroSHEDS (version 1, 2019), available at [www.hydrosheds.org](http://www.hydrosheds.org).

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).

## 5. SAC Aircraft Crashes

### PALE TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 10 June, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) — a resistance actor — reportedly used heavy weapons to [shoot](#) down a State Administration Council (SAC) fighter jet during hostilities between SAC and People's Defence Force (PDF) troops near the Kant Daunt village police station in Pale Township. The fighter jet reportedly crashed into Sa Par Sayt village and killed four civilians, and a [video](#) circulating online the same day purported to show a large wreckage site resulting from the crash. Meanwhile, the SAC [claimed](#) that the jet went down due to a mechanical failure. PDFs first attempted to capture Kant Daunt village in [January 2023](#) but were repelled by SAC troops, and the recent round of fighting began on 2 June when PDFs attempted to capture a SAC outpost at the Kant Daunt police station. The SAC reportedly continued to conduct [airstrikes](#) after the jet went down, including a strike on 14 June that reportedly injured two people and set several buildings in Min Taing Pin village ablaze, amid [continued](#) hostilities in the township. Over [20,000](#) civilians have reportedly been displaced from at least 20 villages in Pale Township due to fighting this month. A township resident [told](#) a media outlet that some internally displaced persons (IDPs) moved south to Magway Region, while others sought shelter in forested areas.

### Dealing with fighter jets and rain

Amid intense fighting in Pale Township, monsoon rains likely mean that displaced people in the township need greater shelter support. Host communities and local resistance actors are reportedly mobilising food and other essential items for IDPs, but the monsoon season will likely impact the response. For example, there may be increased concerns around access to [medical](#) assistance if there are upticks in water-borne diseases. Fighting in Pale Township is not new; but the intensity of fighting increased in late 2023. However, the significant SAC ground presence, recent reinforcements, and continued aerial bombardment suggest that its current level of intensity may continue. Intense fighting is also likely due to the township's

noteworthy location on the Yesagyo-Gangaw road, with the Kant Daunt police [station](#) a key node on the highway for whoever controls it. As SAC troop raids, and intermittent fighting, has been ongoing in the township since at least 2022, humanitarian responders are also likely to encounter people who have been displaced several times — meaning that their personal savings will likely be reduced with local responders likely expected to fill in the gaps — as well as those who have recently fled their homes for the first time.

## 6. Locals Protests Road Tolls

### WETLET TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 11-13 June, around 300 civilians in Wetlet Township reportedly [protested](#) checkpoint toll fees imposed by the National Unity Government's (NUG) Wetlet Township People's Administration Team (PAT), with [hundreds](#) of vehicles reportedly blocking the Wetlet-Shein Ma Kar and Wetlet-Pauk Kan roads. The protest reportedly emerged from opposition to the high costs at checkpoints for passenger vehicles and fuel cargo — reportedly [up to](#) 2 million Myanmar Kyat (approximately 450 USD) per cargo truck, and 5,000-30,000 Myanmar Kyat (approximately 1.1-6.8 USD) per passenger vehicle. A Wetlet administrative official told this analytical unit that tax rates are set by the NUG Ministry of Planning, Finance and Investment, while a local leader reported to a media outlet that [revenue](#) from checkpoint tolls are allocated to other townships, including for humanitarian assistance. However, a protester told this analytical unit that locals face increasing economic hardship which is likely exacerbated by the PAT's fees, and that a lack of transparency regarding revenue allocation may have helped spur the protests. Another Wetlet [local](#) told the media that “locals are struggling to recover from their homes being torched [from State Administration Council (SAC) violence]”, and they had to borrow money and now they're being taxed on top of that”.



## Checkpoint tolls and aid

The protests in Wetlet Township underscore the economic hardships faced by civilians in resistance-controlled areas of northwest Myanmar. Despite widespread support for resistance actors against the SAC, and frequent instances of communities supporting people affected by fighting between the SAC and resistance actors, the protests suggest that the PAT's tolls are more financial contribution than people are willing to stomach. Granted, people might feel differently about paying for something that more clearly resembled humanitarian assistance, even if the NUG claims that part of these tolls are used for that. However, there are also reasons to believe that Wetlet Township residents are now facing greater financial pressures than before, both as fighting drags out and as a result of property damage from the recent earthquakes. Likely adding insult to injury, local responders told this analytical unit that even aid actors had to pay fees to travel with earthquake relief in Sagaing and Wetlet townships. These checkpoint fees may also impact the work of humanitarian responders, who would have to navigate higher operating costs in reaching not only this township but parts of Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and even Mandalay Region. In 2025, SAC trade restrictions between Mandalay city and northern Mandalay Region along Highway 31 — to the east of the Irrawaddy River — meant that civilians and traders increasingly relied on the Sagaing-Shwebo road to circumvent SAC restrictions and move into and out of northern Mandalay Region.

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Checkpoint fees may also impact the work of humanitarian responders, who would have to navigate higher operating costs in reaching not only this township but parts of Sagaing Region, Kachin State, and even Mandalay Region.

## SAC Launches Attacks on Karenni Actors

PEKON TOWNSHIP, SOUTHERN SHAN STATE /  
DEMOSO AND LOIKAW TOWNSHIPS, KARENNI STATE

On 12 June, it was reported that the State Administration Council (SAC) and Pa-O National Army (PNA) had been fighting intensely with Karenni Joint Forces on the Southern Shan-Karenni State border, [displacing](#) thousands of people to Demoso Township. According to the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), around [40,000](#) people from 15 villages have become displaced around the Southern Shan-Karenni State border in June. In December 2024, the SAC and aligned PNA troops reportedly began attacks to [retake](#) control of Moe Bye-Loikaw road, assisted by regular aerial bombardments, including on civilian infrastructure. More recently, the SAC reportedly [sent 2,000 reinforcements](#) towards Yae Pu in Nyaungshwe Township, Moe Bye in Pekon Township, and Kone Thar in Loikaw Township. In Demoso Township, local responders have [already](#) begun to support IDPs in relocating to the western part of the township, farther from the frontlines. The IEC has also [called](#) on international and domestic donors to provide food, shelter, and personal hygiene item assistance to the newly displaced people. Moreover, in likely anticipation of continued fighting, the Moe Bye People's Defence Force (PDF) reportedly [notified](#) the public against travel through Moe Bye village.

## Fighting likely to continue on key trade route

Even as needs rise, continued fighting in this area may impede humanitarian support. Karenni State has been rocked by displacement since the coup, with the Karenni State IEC [saying](#) that around 350,000 people in Karenni State and Pekon Township — the majority of the population — were displaced. It is likely that most of these people are experiencing [food](#), medicine, and shelter shortages, and that local responders are unable to meet existing needs, much less those of new arrivals from the Southern Shan-Karenni State border. Detrimentally for these communities, it is also likely that fighting along this border will be prolonged, preventing

people from safely returning home soon. This is because the Loikaw-Moe Bye road is a significant transportation route, connecting Karenni State to Southern Shan State and Nay Pyi Taw Union Territory. One Loikaw Township [resident](#) conveyed rumours that the SAC would try to retake control of the area around Loikaw town — the Karenni State capital and one of a handful of SAC-administered areas of the state — in order to facilitate December 2025 election polling there. Finally, fighting which impacts trade flows into and out of Karenni State may simultaneously have a detrimental effect on humanitarian responders' ability to procure supplies and reach affected populations; in parts of [Demoso Township](#), for example, petrol has reportedly been unavailable for much of the past week.

## 8 SAC Battles Unified Chin Forces

### TEDIM TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 14 June, Chinland Council (CC) and Chin Brotherhood (CB) troops reportedly launched a [joint attack](#) on State Administration Council (SAC) forces near Mualpi village, in Tedim Township. The attacked SAC forces were recent reinforcements to Tedim Township, sent from Kale in Sagaing Region. These SAC forces had reportedly raided and [torched](#) Mualpi village in late May; a CC source told this analytical unit that the SAC troops had been seeking to recapture Falam town. Also since late May, after the Chinland Defense Force (CDF)–Siyin announced that it would restrict travel on the Tedim-Kale road, there have been reported [shortages](#) of rice, cooking oil, and petrol in Tedim and Tonzang townships. Residents in Hakha and Falam townships are likely facing shortages as well, due to the reliance of local markets in these areas on goods imported through Kale town. The Chin National Front — a CC force — spokesperson told this analytical unit that the CC and CB are collaborating to halt SAC troops entering Chin State. This collaboration comes against the backdrop of a [reported agreement](#) between

the CC and Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) — civilian representatives for CB — in February to merge as the Chin National Council (CNC).

### SAC response and/or aid opening

The joint attack in Tedim is significant because of the cooperation between CB and CC forces. Members of the two blocs have rarely launched joint attacks since alliances fractured in December 2023, and have even [directly fought](#) one another as recently as May 2024. Though there is rumoured to be slow progress in an agreement to merge CB and CC forces, collaboration in fighting suggests that there is some degree of goodwill between at least local commanders, and it bodes well for potential reunification of Chin forces, as proposed in the agreement. At the same time, if SAC forces continue rumoured attempts to re-capture Falam — though mountainous roads and CB and CC presence would likely slow an SAC advance troop movement — civilians in northern Chin State face a high risk of violence, with SAC troops' propensity to attack civilians and their property. CB and CC collaboration could also benefit local responders, including responders of different ethnic groups who must navigate a complex aid landscape and are likely to have previously experienced challenges in the coordination of humanitarian response due to local-level tensions. It will nonetheless be important to monitor the situation on the ground, and the extent to which this collaboration continues, grows, or degrades.

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**FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE** *for*  
**Humanitarian  
Responders**

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